Manila Motor Company Essay

In May 1954, capital of the Philippines Motor Comp both filed in the municipal Court of Manila a thrill to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as personal chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941. Defendant pleaded prescriptionchanroblesvirtualnatural lawlibrary 1941 to 1954. The commission was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First antecedent saw differently, sustaining Plaintiffs line of reasoning that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting the m during which said laws were in work lead years and eight months 1 the ten-year endpoint had not yet elapsed when plaintiff sued for collection in May 1954. then said court ordered the retort of the case to the municipal judge for mental testing on the merits. Defendant appealed.IssueWhether or not the moratorium laws did not have the yield of suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as decl ard b y this court in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off.HeldIn Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial SC held that the moratorium laws suspend the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be express however, in fairness to Appellant, that the Montilla decision came brush up after he had submitted his brief. And in practice to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to think up that at the time of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional economy confers no right, creates no office, affords no certificate and justifies no acts performed under it. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) There are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooleys Constitutional Limitations eighth ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its do since the actual existence of a ordinance prior to such declaration is an artisan fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic plan of attack is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. rightfulness Rep., 1025, 1030). Judgment affirmed, without costs.